루이 18세
시간엄수는 군주의 예절이다.
마리아 칼라스
An opera begins long before the curtain goes up and ends long after it has come down. It starts in my imagination, it becomes my life, and it stays part of my life long after I’ve left the opera house.
Don’t talk to me about rules, dear. Wherever I stay I make the goddam rules.
First I lost my voice, then I lost my figure and then I lost Onassis.
I cannot switch my voice. My voice is not like an elevator going up and down.
I don’t know what happens to me on stage. Something else seems to take over.
I don’t need the money, dear. I work for art.
I prepare myself for rehearsals like I would for marriage.
I will not be sued! I have the voice of an angel!
I would like to be Maria, but there is La Callas who demands that I carry myself with her dignity.
It is like comparing champagne with cognac. No – with Coca-Cola.
Love is so much better when you’re not married.
On stage, I am in the dark.
Real friends are very special, but you have to be careful because sometimes you have a friend and you think they are made of rock, then suddenly you realise they’re only made of sand. It’s a terrible thing to go through life thinking that you have a rock o
When music fails to agree to the ear, to soothe the ear and the heart and the senses, then it has missed its point.
When my enemies stop hissing, I shall know I’m slipping.
Women are not pals enough with men, so we must make ourselves indispensable. After all, we have the greatest weapon in our hands by just being women.
You are born an artist or you are not. And you stay an artist, dear, even if your voice is less of a fireworks. The artist is always there.
장 피아제
Accommodation of mental structures to reality implies the existence of assimilatory schemata apart from which any structure would be impossible.
Causality, like the other categories, therefore evolves on the plane of thought from an initial egocentrism to a combined objectivity and relativity, thus reproducing, in surpassing, its earlier sensorimotor evolution.
During the earliest stages of thought, accommodation remains on the surface of physical as well as social experience.
During the earliest stages the child perceives things like a solipsist who is unaware of himself as subject and is familiar only with his own actions.
Every acquisition of accommodation becomes material for assimilation, but assimilation always resists new accommodations.
From this time on, the universe is built up into an aggregate of permanent objects connected by causal relations that are independent of the subject and are placed in objective space and time.
I have always detested any departure from reality, an attitude which I relate to my mother’s poor mental health.
In genetic epistemology, as in developmental psychology, too, there is never an absolute beginning.
In its beginnings, assimilation is essentially the utilisation of the external environment by the subject to nourish his hereditary or acquired schemata.
In other words, knowledge of the external world begins with an immediate utilisation of things, whereas knowledge of self is stopped by this purely practical and utilitarian contact.
In the course of the first two years of childhood the evolution of sensorimotor intelligence, and also the correlative elaboration of the universe, seem, as we have tried to analyse them, to lead to a state of equilibrium bordering on rational thought.
It is at this level that the external world and the self remain undissociated to such a point that neither objects nor spatial, temporal, or causal objectifications are possible.
It is with children that we have the best chance of studying the development of logical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, physical knowledge, and so forth.
Knowing reality means constructing systems of transformations that correspond, more or less adequately, to reality.
Knowledge, then, is a system of transformations that become progressively adequate.
Logic and mathematics are nothing but specialised linguistic structures.
Logical positivists have never taken psychology into account in their epistemology, but they affirm that logical beings and mathematical beings are nothing but linguistic structures.
On the one hand, there are individual actions such as throwing, pushing, touching, rubbing. It is these individual actions that give rise most of the time to abstraction from objects.
Our problem, from the point of view of psychology and from the point of view of genetic epistemology, is to explain how the transition is made from a lower level of knowledge to a level that is judged to be higher.
Reflective abstraction, however, is based not on individual actions but on coordinated actions.
Scientific knowledge is in perpetual evolution; it finds itself changed from one day to the next.
Scientific thought, then, is not momentary; it is not a static instance; it is a process.
The current state of knowledge is a moment in history, changing just as rapidly as the state of knowledge in the past has ever changed and, in many instances, more rapidly.
The first type of abstraction from objects I shall refer to as simple abstraction, but the second type I shall call reflective abstraction, using this term in a double sense.
The formation of the universe, which seemed accomplished with that of sensorimotor intelligence, is continued throughout the development of thought, which is natural, but is continued while seeming at first to repeat itself, before truly progressing to enc
The more the schemata are differentiated, the smaller the gap between the new and the familiar becomes, so that novelty, instead of constituting an annoyance avoided by the subject, becomes a problem and invites searching.
The self thus becomes aware of itself, at least in its practical action, and discovers itself as a cause among other causes and as an object subject to the same laws as other objects.
This means that no single logic is strong enough to support the total construction of human knowledge.
Thus it may be seen that intellectual activity begins with confusion of experience and of awareness of the self, by virtue of the chaotic undifferentiation of accommodation and assimilation.
To express the same idea in still another way, I think that human knowledge is essentially active.
We recall how, starting with purely practical and quasi-physiological groups, the child begins by elaborating subjective groups, then arrives at objective groups, and only then becomes capable of representative groups.